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Abstract
In the present study, we investigated perceived responsibility, evidence strengthening, and
defendant gender in the context of a criminal trial involving DNA. Evidence was introduced
post-trial and varied as strengthening the defendant’s guilt v. innocence. We also examined
perceptions of perceived responsibility for verdict in order to more closely evaluate the role of
regret in decision-making. Results indicated that DNA evidence is perceived as reliable,
regardless of whether it strengthened guilt or innocence. In addition, greater confidence in
verdict was observed when evidence strengthened the guilt of a female defendant vs. a male
defendant. Finally, jurors experiencing high levels of regret perceived DNA evidence more
selectively compared to jurors with low levels of regret, supporting the importance of identifying
individual difference factors prior to trial.
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The Influence of Regret Proneness, Evidence Strengthening,
and Perceived Responsibility on Verdict Preference.
Decision-making is critical to our lives. When confronted with a decision, we often
weigh the pros and cons of each option and attempt to arrive at the best choice. This process has
been the topic of copious research in both cognitive and social psychology arenas. For example,
rational choice theory postulates that individuals are rational choosers and will carefully compare
options to maximize our preferred choice (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). In other words,
we will always choose the option best suited for the situation. However, decision-making is not
always so straightforward. Several factors are at play when making a decision, beyond simply
choosing the most rational option. In the present study, we examined individuals’ perceptions of
decision-making in the context of a criminal trial.
Regret and Decision Making
One factor closely related to decision-making is regret. Researchers began theorizing
about the role of regret in consumer decision-making during the economic boom of the 1980s.
Regret theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982) emerged from Expected Utility Theory
(von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), which proposed that decisions are made on the goal of
maximum utility and financial payoff, or rather the pain and pleasure associated with the
outcome of an option. However, while regret and joy only happen after the decision is made,
they are often taken into account when evaluating all the options. Regret theory states that the
decision maker is usually prepared to trade financial return in order to avoid regret. Meaning,
people are generally willing to sacrifice some pleasure in order to avoid potential pain.
Therefore, by incorporating regret, the Expected Utility Theory becomes a better predictor of
decisions. Furthermore, researchers have found that most people are averse to regret to the point
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that they seek to avoid choosing options that will induce regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden,
1982; Zeelenberg, 1999). Interestingly though, individuals tend to overestimate the amount and
intensity of emotions compared to when they actually experience it (Buehler & McFarland,
2001; Kermer, Driver Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006). This is especially true when experiencing
the emotion of regret compared to other emotions.
Upon further analysis of the regret construct, Sugden (1985) proposed two components to
the construct of regret: feelings of responsibility, blame, and subjective evaluation of the quality
of the decision and comparison of chosen option to alternatives. As an emotion, it is the reaction
to a past behavior or decision. “Regret itself is a negative, cognitive-based emotion that is
experienced when we realize or imagine that the present situation could have been better had we
acted differently” (Sandberg & Conner, 2008, p. 590). Once a decision is made, the individual
must contend with the possibility that it may not have been the best option.
Regret as a Mediator
The amount of regret felt can vary significantly depending on the decision the individual
makes. Roese and Summerville (2005) suggested that regret is intensified by perceptions of
future opportunity, known as the opportunity principle. Through a survey, they found that the life
domains that are most regretted are the areas with the greatest potential for change, such as
education, career, and romance. Conversely, the less regretted life domains have less potential
for change, such as friends, spirituality, and community. It is the more stable factors of life that
are regretted the least. For example, Boninger, Gleicher, and Strathman (1994) found that people
who habitually consider future consequences and how they may avoid future negative outcomes
experience less, rather than more, intense regret after a negative outcome. These individuals
learned from their past regrettable decisions in order to reduce the amount of regret they would
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have in the future. Using the opportunity principle, people tend to learn from their past mistakes
and therefore develop satisfactory stable situations. However, there is some debate over the
opportunity principle. In a more recent study, Beike, Markman, and Karadogan (2009) conducted
a series of 3 experiments and found that feelings of regret are more likely elicited by perceptions
of lost opportunities. People tend to have more regret for outcomes that could have been changed
in the past but cannot be changed now. These are the stable factors that take more time to change
once they are set, such as family and community.
From the research, it appears that regret is a highly individualized, rather than universal,
construct. Each person has their own standards for acceptability and weighted importance on
their various decisions. Furthermore, everyone has his or her own threshold for experiencing
regret. Interestingly though, there appears to be some patterns along the gender lines emerging
with regard to what is a regrettable decision. Men are more likely to experience regrets of
inaction whereas women are more likely to experience regrets of action (Dickson, Paul,
Herbison, & Silva, 1998; Klassen, Williams, & Levitt, 1989; Oswalt, Cameron, & Koob, 2005;
Roese, Pennington, Coleman, Janicki, Li, & Kenrick, 2006). Although these studies were limited
to regret associated with sexual acts, they are interesting to consider. Identifying an individual’s
personal threshold for regret could indicate their potential leanings toward guilty or not guilty
verdict before evidence is even presented.
Finally, there are several aspects of the decision itself that influences the amount of regret
individuals expect to feel. When an individual makes a poor decision that is unconventional, they
are more likely to expect feeling regret even with more traditional options available (Simonson,
1992). Additionally, more regret is expected for decisions of action rather than failures to act,
such as accepting bad advice rather than rejecting good advice (Crawford, McConnell, Lewis, &
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Sherman, 2002) or acting foolishly rather than failing to act wisely (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995;
see Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004). Learning of the outcomes to other alternatives
after making a poor decision is also more expected to elicit feelings of regret than if the
alternative outcomes are unknown (Ritov & Baron, 1995; Zeelenberg, 1999). Finally, people
expect to experience more regret if they learn they had failed by a narrow margin rather than a
wide margin (i.e. missing a bus by 2 minutes versus 15 minutes, Kahneman & Tversky, 1982;
Medvec, Madey & Gilovich, 1995). These findings indicate that there is some consideration of
regret expected before an individual makes a decision.
Anticipated regret and expected feedback. Anticipated regret has been demonstrated to
play a crucial role in decision-making. In a review of anticipated regret, Anderson (2003) argued
that there are seven contributors to anticipated regret: expected outcome feedback, perceived
responsibility, reversibility, degree of loss aversion, mutability, anticipated future opportunities,
and abnormal options. Each of these contributors has empirical support indicating their impact
on anticipated regret. For the purposes of the present study, only outcome feedback and
perceived responsibility are considered in the context of our criminal trial scenarios.
More regret is experienced when it is believed that a similar decision must be made in the
future (Markman, Garvanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993). Fear of repeating the same mistake
or not realizing the decision was wrong until it is too late makes anticipated future opportunities
a powerful contributor to anticipated regret. In the same vein, aversion to feelings of regret
causes people to overestimate the amount of regret they expect to feel if they make a sub-optimal
decision. Through a series of studies, Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, and Wilson (2004) found that
people are less susceptible to regret than they expect. Specifically, individuals tend to be
hypersensitive to regret to the point of inflating its impact on their decisions. This expectation of
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regret is often factored into how a decision is made. For example, in escalation situations, people
tend consider in the emotions they expect to experience (i.e. anticipated regret) with events that
have happened in the past (i.e. responsibility for initiating the previous decision; Wong &
Kwong, 2007). Furthermore, in a meta-analysis, anticipated regret accounted for 7% of the total
variance in decisions after attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control were
controlled for (Sandberg & Conner, 2008). In addition, when an individual expects to know the
outcome of all the options prior to making the decision, anticipated regret is factored in. In other
words, comparing what is with what could have been is one of the root causes of regret
(Zeelenberg, 1999). This is primarily due to the expectation of feedback regarding other options
(Larrick & Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1995; Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg &
Beattie, 1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996). When a person is expecting
to learn how well or poorly each option did, the decision becomes more complex and anticipated
regret is factored in. Even if the individual is not expecting feedback, they can still experience
regret and anticipate regret. This can be particularly powerful within the court setting, after a
verdict is rendered when a juror learns of additional evidence proving the alternate verdict.
Perceived responsibility. The more responsible a person feels for the decision outcome,
the more they will factor regret into their decision. Some research has found that more regret is
expected when the decision is a personal responsibility, unless the choice seems well justified or
not causally related to an experienced bad outcome (Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Inman & Zeelenberg,
2002; Simonson, 1992; van Dijk, van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, van den Bos,
van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). Conversely, others claim that responsibility is neither a necessary nor
substantial component of regret (Connolly, Ordonez, and Coughlan, 1997). More recently,
several studies have indicated that responsibility is an important component of regret, though it is
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unclear whether it is a necessary one (Ordonez & Connolly, 2000; Zeelenberg, van Dijk, &
Manstead, 1998, 2000). Finally, Seta, McElroy, and Seta (2001) found that responsibility is a
possible moderating variable on research regarding the effect of consistency on regret.
Affect. An individual’s overall affect could potentially mediate interpretation of a
situation and influence an individual’s judgments and decisions. Watson and Tellegen (1985)
presented a two-factor model of affect, including Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect
(NA). According to Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988), PA refers to the extent a person feels
“enthusiastic, active, and alert”. Therefore, an individual with high PA would feel energetic and
excited and a low PA person would feel lethargic and depressed. Conversely, NA reflects the
level of distress or disengagement an individual is experiencing. Thus, a high NA person would
exhibit anger, fear, or nervousness. A low NA person would exhibit calmness and tranquility. It
is important to note that these two dimensions are not polar opposites, but rather are distinct
dimensions that can fluctuate independently and are not always correlated with one another (see
Watson, et al., 1988).
In order to measure this concept, Watson, et al. (1988) developed the Positive Affect
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) as a means of identifying and clarifying the dominant
dimensions of affect. The measure consists of 20 terms, with 10 creating the PA subscale and 10
for the NA subscale, that are rated on a 5-point scale. Participants rank how they are feeling right
now in regards to each term on this scale. The measure has good internal consistency, with
Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .86 to .90 for the PA subscale and .84 to .87 for the NA subscale.
The current study will examine the affective state of the participant, rather than their affective
stable traits. Furthermore, this measure will indicate the participant’s level of distress and other
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verdict.
Additional mediating factors. Life’s major decisions, or at the very least long-term
decisions, such as the purchase of a new car, which college to attend and who to marry, are very
difficult not only to form but also to reverse. Several researchers have demonstrated that people
tend to anticipate less regret if the decision is reversible (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000; Zeelenberg,
Beattie, van der Plight, & de Vries, 1996). However, Gilbert and Ebert (2002) found that people
actually experience less satisfaction with reversible decisions than with irreversible decisions.
Thus, while reversible decisions are easier to make, they do come with only moderate
satisfaction. Individuals also experience an aversion to loss associated with decision-making.
Loss aversion refers to the active, though not always conscious, avoidance of any knowledge
regarding the other options’ outcomes. This is a modification of the original Regret theory.
People tend to avoid knowledge of an outcome, especially if the effects of regret over a bad
outcome are greater than the effect of rejoicing over a good one (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov &
Baron, 1995). For example, investors who limit their knowledge of the day-to-day fluctuations
for their investments are attempting to avoid knowing how much they gained or lost in a given
day. Another example can be found in women who avoided having children before the test for
Huntington’s disease was discovered and still avoid having the test now that their childbearing
years are over. Now that the decision is irreversible, they do not want to know that they could
have had children safely and feel the loss resulting from their decision. This concept is also
applicable within the judicial system, when post-verdict jurors avoid media coverage of the
appeals and emerging evidence of their trial. It is human tendency to weigh outcomes viewed as
losses more heavily than equivalent gains (Anderson, 2003).
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Moderating Characteristics and Regret
Cognitive dissonance. The amount of regret experienced has a great deal to do with the
incongruity between an individual’s choice and information presented that counters that choice.
Cognitive dissonance theory states that when one’s thoughts and behaviors are not consistent,
individuals feel pressure to align these two elements (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1964).
Research on cognitive dissonance suggests that experiencing dissonance must be at a severe
level for a person to change. For example, Vinski and Tryon (2009) argued that their nonsignificant findings in an induced hypocrisy paradigm for academic cheating are explained by
the fact that, while aware of hypocritical behavior, participants have chosen simply to live with
their dissonance rather than change their behavior. Additionally, 90% of participants admitting to
cheating in the past reported no punishment for their actions. This construct permeates almost
every aspect of life. When a person is on a jury, they may often experience cognitive dissonance
when they believe an individual is guilty but the evidence does not prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is particularly true when the evidence of the case is circumstantial or
inconclusive. In the present study, dissonance will be indirectly measured through observed
differences in verdict preference as a function of evidence strengthening. Individuals should
experience dissonance when evidence strength is counter-attitudinal with verdict. This aspect of
our study generalizes to death-qualified jurors as our trial manipulations involve a capital
offense. This is important considering the research that demonstrates that death-qualified jurors
tend to express more concern about the crime, more favorable attitudes toward the police and
prosecutors, less sympathy for criminal defendants, more suspicion of defense attorneys and
greater impatience with due process safeguards in criminal trials (Bronson, 1970; Fitzgerald &
Ellsworth, 1984; Vidmar & Ellsworth, 1974). In addition, Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth, and
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Harrington (1984) found that death-qualified jurors interpreted the evidence in favor of the
prosecution and had a lower threshold of conviction compared to non-death-qualified jurors.
Furthermore, death-qualified participants expressed less regret for erroneous convictions and
more regret for erroneous acquittals. The current study is the first attempt to apply what is known
about regret and dissonance to the courtroom. We hope our findings will assist attorneys in
understanding the role of regret and death-qualification.
Authoritarianism. In order to quantitatively measure an individual’s tendency to hold
authoritarianism beliefs, Altemeyer (1981) introduced the concept of the “right-wing
authoritarian” and developed the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale. This scale was derived
from 3 of the subcategories in Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford’s (1950)
original California F (fascism) scale. This new scale measures traditional authoritarianism on 2
dimensions: “authoritarian aggression and submission” and “conservatism” (see Manganelli
Rattazzi, Bobbio, & Canova, 2007; Van Hiel, Cornelis, Roets, & De Clerco, 2007).
Authoritarian submission refers to the tendency to uncritically submissive to authority.
Authoritarian aggression indicates a feeling of anger towards those who violate the social norms.
Finally, conservatism refers to the adhesion to conventional social norms and values. Similarly,
legal authoritarians tend to believe in the ability of the criminal justice system to prosecute guilty
persons (Butler & Moran, 2002; Butler & Wasserman, 2006; Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth,
1984; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984; Haney, Hurtado, & Vega, 1994; Thompson, Cowan,
Ellsworth, & Harrington, 1984). Legal authoritarianism has been found to be a predicting factor
in verdicts for both capital and non-capital cases (Martin & Cohn, 2004; Narby, Cutler, &
Moran, 1993). This can be particularly important in jury selection, when many individuals with a
particular bias as potential jurors. Furthermore, authoritarians tend to give harsher punishments
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to defendants. Butler and Moran (2007) demonstrated that death-qualified and legal authoritarian
participants were significantly more likely to recommend the death sentence than their non-death
qualified counterparts.
Given the need to screen jurors for bias for or against the defendant, Kassin and
Wrightsman (1983) developed the Juror Bias Scale (JBS) as a measure for pre-trial juror bias.
This scale was designed to assess an individual’s tendency to convict or acquit across two
dimensions: probability of guilt and the individual’s threshold of reasonable doubt (Kassin &
Wrightsman, 1983; Myers & Lecci, 1998). This scale is understood to be a measure of legal
authoritarianism. Enough overlap between the JBS and traditional authoritarianism to be
considered highly correlated, but not entirely redundant (Narby, et al., 1993). It is necessary to
measure both right wing authoritarianism and legal authoritarianism in order to understand the
potential juror’s disposition. De la Fuente, de la Fuente, and Garcia (2003) found that juror bias
plays a significant role in verdict rendering when the admitted evidence is inconclusive or
circumstantial. This is particularly important given that most trials are built upon this type of
evidence, since when the evidence clearly indicates guilt or innocence the case does not
generally reach a jury. Furthermore, Thompson and Dennison (2004) utilized the JBS in their
study of the impact of graphic evidence of violence (GEV) on mock juror verdicts. They found
no difference between participants in the GEV – present and GEV – absent conditions.
However, when GEV was present, defense-biased mock jurors had a higher threshold for
conviction than when the GEV was absent. Prosecution-biased participants did not differ in their
conviction thresholds between conditions. Prosecution-biased individuals rendering more guilty
verdicts overall and across conditions could cause this.
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Maximization and Satisficing. Another moderating variable in the relation between
regret and decision-making is an individual’s tendency to exhaust all options, or “maximize”,
and their tendency to experience regret. Given all of the factors influencing regret and
anticipated regret, research has demonstrated that people routinely violate the principles of
rational choice (Baron, 2000; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky, 1969; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981). They do not always make the best decision based on the pros and cons of
each option. However, some people do attempt to maximize the gains from any decision. Simon
(1955, 1956, 1957) argued that the goal of maximization is generally unrealizable. Instead,
people actually have the goal of “satisficing” rather than maximizing. To satisfice, people need
only to have a threshold of acceptability and their subsequent decision will tend to be good
enough. In order to assess the construct of maximization, Schwartz, B., et al. (2002) developed
the Maximization and Regret scales. The Maximization Scale measures the tendency of the
individual to satisfice or maximize their decisions. This 13-item scale focuses on 3 factors of
decision-making: openness to better options, choosing the best option, and setting high
standards for oneself. A fourth factor emerged during the development of the Maximization
Scale, which ultimately became the Regret Scale. This scale measures the tendency to experience
regret and includes 5 items. Findings from the development and validation studies of these scales
have shown that maximizers tend to be more concerned with their relative position (social
comparison) than satisficers and are generally less happy. Furthermore, maximizing was
positively correlated with regret, depression, and decision difficulty and negatively correlated
with happiness, life satisfaction, optimism, and decision outcome satisfaction (Schwartz, et al.,
2002).
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Spunt, Rassin, and Epstein (2009) used the Regret Scale in their study regarding aversive
and avoidant indecisiveness. They found that aversive indecisiveness (negative affect and threatoriented cognition when making and evaluating decisions) is associated with regret proneness
and maximization. Avoidance indecisiveness (avoidant preferences and difficulties making
decisions) was not. Another study used both scales to assess job satisfaction of recent college
graduates (Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006). Their findings indicated that maximizers secured
more lucrative starting salaries but were less satisfied with the jobs they obtained. Finally, DarNimrod, Rawn, Lehman, and Schwartz (2009) used the scales to illustrate the “Maximization
Paradox”. They argued that maximizers tend to sacrifice resources to attain more options that
ultimately reduce their satisfaction. They tend to find an exhaustive list of possible options and
are consequently less satisfied with their decision. These combined findings indicate that the
scales have adequate construct validity and reliability across situations.
Need for Closure. A final moderating variable that could influence decision-making is
the need for closure. Need for closure (NFC) indicates a desire for unambiguous and definite
knowledge, rather than confusing or vague situations, when negotiating actions or thoughts
(Kruglanski, 1989). Within this construct, it is better to receive even bad information than no
information at all. Additionally, individuals vary in their need of this construct such that the
motivation to attain clear, precise closure can be viewed as one end of a continuum and the need
to avoid closure at the other end (Kruglanski, 1989). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) developed a
measure of individual differences in NFC and its reliability and validity has been established,
Cronbach’s α = .84. This measure consists of five subsets of items that contribute to an
individual’s need to make a decision and avoid ambiguity. The subsets are: (a) preference for
order and structure; (b) preference for predictability; (c) decisiveness; (d) discomfort with
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ambiguity; and (e) shortsightedness. Kenhove, Vermeir, and Verniers (2001) utilized a
shortened, 24-item of this measure with good reliability, Cronbach’s α = .77, in their study. It is
this version that will be used in the present study.
Research has indicated clear differences between individuals scoring high on the NFC
measure and those scoring low. For example, individuals scoring high on the NFC scale will tend
to avoid uncertain or unclear situations. He or she will be more likely to be closed-minded and
rigid in their thoughts. Moreover, he or she will also base their decision on pre-existing schemas
and will avoid additional information (Kenhove, et al., 2001). Furthermore, Kruglanski, Peri, and
Zakai (1991) found that individuals measuring high on the NFC measure tended to reject deviant
individuals and praise those that conform to conventional standards. Finally, high NFC
individuals are more satisfied with knowledge that is “politically conservative, socially
intolerant, anti-democratic, and system-justifying” than knowledge that could be construed as
threat to the status quo (Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999). Conversely, individuals with low
NFC level will often change their opinion or behavior in light of new evidence or knowledge.
Additionally, they will process more information and are often reluctant to make a decision
without all the facts (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). In a trial setting, there is pressure on the jury
to render a verdict quickly. In this scenario, those jurors scoring high on the NFC scale will be
less likely to listen to new perspectives from the other jurors and will have made their decision
early on.
Gender
The defendant in a trial can often influence the juror’s perception simply based on their
physical characteristics. Previous research has demonstrated increased leniency for female
defendants when compared to male defendants (Finkelhor & Redfield, 1984; Hetherton &
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Beardsall, 1988). However, these studies did not specify what charges were brought against the
defendant. More recently, researchers have begun asking if there were lesser charge options
available for the participants, would the same effect apply? Cheyne and Dennison (2005) studied
the effect of defendant gender and the suddenness of the crime on verdict renderings of murder
and manslaughter. They found that female defendants were more likely to be found guilty of
manslaughter rather than murder than male defendants in the same scenario. Conversely, male
defendants are more likely to be found guilty of murder than female defendants. Therefore, while
there are many guilty verdicts, women often receive convictions that carry lower sentences. It is
possible that women are viewed as more justified in their criminal acts than men.
More recently, Pozzulo, Dempsey, Maeder, and Allen (2010) found that male defendants
received more guilty verdicts than female defendants. Specifically in sex abuse cases, male
defendants are considered more culpable than female defendants (McCoy & Gray, 2007; Quas
Bottoms, Haegerich, & Nysse-Carris, 2002; Rogers & Davies, 2007). Men tend to be seen as
more predatory than women in these types of cases.
Interestingly, Ahola, Hellstöm, and Christianson (2010) evaluated the role of defendant
gender across 5 crime accounts: (a) vandalism, (b) arson, (c) child abuse, (d) child molestation,
and (e) homicide. They found that, across all scenarios, judges and jurors evaluated the
defendant more harshly if the defendant was the same gender as the evaluator. Additionally, nonevaluators, such as police officers, defense counselors, and students, judged the defendant more
harshly if he were a male rather than female. This gender effect is expected to be present in the
current study.
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The Present Study
To date, this is the first study to investigate the role of regret proneness in jurors during
the guilt phase of a trial. Predicting factors for verdict could influence the voir dire process and
add to the existing literature of juror predispositions for certain verdicts. The current study aims
to combine the role of the juror with the construct of anticipated regret. The purpose is to
investigate decision-making in the context of evidence strengthening in a case involving the
introduction of DNA evidence post-trial. In this context, various moderating and mediating
factors will be examined: i.e., regret proneness, legal authoritarianism, defendant gender, and
affect. We hypothesize the following:
H1: Moderating effects of evidence strengthening on verdict from Time1 to Time2, such
that DNA evidence will influence verdict at Time2 as well as confidence levels in verdict.
Specifically, DNA evidence will increase confidence in verdict at Time2, regardless of guilt or
innocence. Additionally, defendant gender and perceived responsibility are hypothesized to
influence verdict, both at Time1 and Time2. Male defendants are expected to receive more guilty
verdicts than female defendants at Time1. Additionally, confidence levels in this verdict are
expected to be higher if the defendant is male rather than female. Participants who believe they
are solely responsible for the verdict will report lower confidence in their verdict at Time1 and
Time2 than participants who are told that they are part of a jury.
H2: Mediating effects of anticipated regret, and scores on PANAS on perceptions of the
importance of DNA evidence in determining verdict. Individuals prone to experiencing regret
will demonstrate lower confidence in their verdict when compared to individuals not prone to
regret at both Time1 and Time2. Additionally, the DNA evidence, regardless on whether it
strengthened guilt or innocence, will be considered reliable as evidenced by increased confidence
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levels in verdicts after the additional evidence is introduced. However, participant’s prone to
regret will continue to have overall lower ratings of confidence in their verdicts. Finally, when
the DNA evidence is incongruent with the initial verdict, the participant will report experiencing
more overall negative affect and less overall positive affect. Conversely, if the DNA evidence is
aligned with the initial verdict, participants will report more positive affect and less negative
affect.
Method
Participants
Participants were 122 students from Roger Williams University. Seventy-four were
female and 48 were male. They were all between 18 and 24 years of age and were predominantly
Caucasian (89.3%). Over half (67.5%) identified themselves as “slightly liberal” or “liberal.”
Additionally, nearly half (51.3%) reported being employed or being a close friend or relative of
someone who is employed by the justice system. Participants were tested during class time and
participated in the study for extra credit or as part of a course requirement.
Materials and Procedure
Design. The present study is a 2 (Perceived Responsibility: Sole Decider v. Majority
Decision) x 2 (Evidence Strengthening: In Favor of Guilt v. Innocence) x 2 (Defendant Gender:
Male v. Female) x 2 (verdict at Time1 and Time2) Mixed Model design with verdict preference
acting as the within-subject factor.
Materials. Materials included a signed informed consent form, (see Appendix A), the
Maximization and Regret Scales, Legal Authoritarian Scale, Maximizing Tendency Scale, Juror
Bias Scale, the Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), and the Need for Closure
Scale (short version). In addition, the questionnaires included a modified summary of the guilt
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phase of the Wilson v. United States (2010) trial, including the perceived responsibility and
defendant gender variable manipulations, as well as evidence strengthening scenarios after a
verdict was rendered. Demographic information was also gathered. See Appendix B for sample
participant packet.
Procedure. The sample was selected by a convenience sampling method from
undergraduate students of psychology. Students opting to participate were given class time to
complete the questionnaire. After obtaining informed consent, participants were given one of
eight packets to complete. Each packet contained the pre-trial measures, individual difference
measures, the experimental scenario and post-trial measures. Upon completion, participants were
given a debriefing form and the opportunity to ask any questions. They were thanked for their
time and their participation was noted to ensure they received course credit.
Results
A Chi-Square analysis revealed no difference in verdict preference for death-qualified
and non death-qualified individuals at both the post-trial verdict (Time1) and post-DNA verdict
(Time2, p = .927 and .692). Therefore, the entire sample was utilized for the analyses. A linear
measure for verdict was created, incorporating verdict and the participant’s level of confidence
with their verdict. The new index ranged from -4 (high confidence in an innocent verdict) to +4
(high confidence in a guilty verdict).
To test the moderating effects of evidence strengthening, a Repeated Measures ANOVA
was utilized, with verdict acting as the within subject variable. This was required, as the DNA
evidence was not presented until after the initial verdict was rendered, thus it was the only
manipulated variable presented to each participant between Time1 and Time2. Any change in
verdict or confidence level between Time1 and Time2 can be reasonably attributed to the
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Evidence Strengthening manipulation. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 Repeated Measures ANOVA was
conducted, with the within-subjects factor as verdict rendered at Time1 and Time 2. A significant
Evidence Strengthening by Verdict effect was found: Wilks’ Lambda = .53, F(1, 114) = 101.97,
p < .001, ηp2 = .47. Evidence strengthening guilt revealed higher confidence in guilt verdicts
post-DNA vs. pre-DNA (4.57 v. 2.59). The same pattern was found for evidence strengthening
innocence (-3.23 v. 2.14; see Table 1). Additionally, a significant Gender by Verdict effect
emerged such that decreases in verdict confidence were observed post-DNA for both male and
female defendants, more so for females compared to males (pre-DNA = 3.10, post-DNA = .232
for female v. pre-DNA = 1.62, post-DNA = 1.11 for male), Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F(1, 114) =
10.44, p = .002, ηp2 = .084 (see Table 2). A significant effect for Evidence Strengthening
between subjects was also revealed, F(1, 114) = 42.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .27. More confidence was
reported when the DNA evidence strengthened guilt versus innocence (3.58 v. -.54, see Table 1).
To test hypothesis 2, we conducted linear regressions to identify the mediating factors for
perceptions of the importance of DNA evidence on verdict at Time2, including our measures of
dissonance, regret proneness and mood. We excluded the verdict at Time1 since the DNA
evidence was not introduced or mentioned until after the initial verdict was rendered.
Additionally, participants who did not change their verdict between Time1 and Time2 were
excluded from this path analysis. Given that there was no change in verdict, there would be
minimal cause for dissonance, particularly if the DNA evidence strengthened their initial verdict.
Therefore, 42 participants were included in the analysis (34.1%). Linear regressions revealed
partial mediation for Negative Affect and verdict + confidence index at Time2 approaching
significance, ß = -.29, p = .06, r2 = .08, R = .29 (see Figure for display of path analysis).
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Additional linear regressions revealed defendant gender and verdict as significant
predictors of regret. Guilty verdicts predicted higher levels of regret proneness compared to not
guilty verdicts at Time1, ß = .26, p = .003, r2 = .05. The same effect was found for guilty versus
not guilty verdicts at Time2, ß = .26, p = .004, r2 = .07. Furthermore, higher levels of regret
proneness were predicted when the defendant was female compared to male, ß = -.20, p = .025,
r2 = .05. A subsequent t-test also revealed significant within-group differences in verdict
confidence. Individuals high in regret proneness reported less confidence with post-DNA verdict
compared to pre-DNA evidence (M = 1.25 v. M = 3.21): t(121) = -2.71, p = .009.
Discussion
Support for moderating effects for evidence strengthening and gender in the context of a
criminal trial is provided through our findings. The results from this study indicate that jurors
perceive DNA evidence as reliable, regardless of whether it strengthened guilt or innocence.
However, more confidence was reported when the evidence strengthened a guilty verdict rather
than a not guilty one. The DNA evidence strengthening guilt could have acted as a justification
for participants who were unsure about their decision to render a guilty verdict, providing them
with some piece of evidence to defend their decision. Interestingly though, higher levels of regret
proneness were found in participants who rendered a guilty verdict, both at Time1 and Time2.
Taken together, these results indicate that while participants are indeed reporting higher levels of
confidence based on the DNA evidence, they are still experiencing some level of dissonance in
convicting a person of a capital felony. The DNA evidence is the basis for their decision, but the
possibility of an erroneous verdict still remained in the minds of our participant-jurors.
The defendant’s gender was also found to play a role in verdict preference when DNA
evidence is introduced. Overall, confidence in verdict declined for both male and female
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defendants, but more so for females compared to males. This result lends support to previous
research findings that female defendants receive convictions for lesser charges (manslaughter v.
murder) and shorter sentences than male defendants (Finkelhor & Redfield, 1984; Hetherton &
Beardsall, 1988; Cheyne & Dennison, 2005). Additionally, in our study higher levels of regret
proneness were found in participants who rendered a verdict for a female defendant. The verdict
was only rendered for the charge of first-degree murder, an extremely serious offense. No other
charges were included that would result in a shorter sentence. Therefore, in light of the evidence,
participants alleviated their feelings of dissonance (i.e., rendering a verdict but wanting to
convict on a lesser charge) by indicating that they were less confident in their verdict for female
defendants. Had another option been available, it is possible that female defendants would be
more likely to receive the lesser charge.
We also found that regret alone does not mediate perceptions of DNA importance. In
fact, as regret proneness increased, DNA evidence was considered to be less convincing. This
result could be attributed to regret-prone participants perceiving the DNA evidence more
selectively compared to participants with low levels of regret, supporting the importance of
identifying individual difference factors prior to trial. In fact, participants prone to regret actually
reported less confidence in their verdict after reading the DNA evidence, regardless of whether
this evidence was in support or opposition to their original verdict. This finding supports the
conclusions of Schwartz, et al. (2002), such that individuals prone to regret are more likely to
report less overall satisfaction with their decisions as well as increased difficulty in decisionmaking. Furthermore, Larrick and Boles (1995; see also Ritov 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1995;
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998) found that, when faced with a difficult decision,
individuals tend to choose the option that would allow them to avoid feedback that could cause

REGRET PRONENESS, EVIDENCE STRENGTHENING

21

regret. Since the DNA evidence was not anticipated, nor was it avoidable, participants could
have rationalized their decision by placing less confidence in the DNA evidence. It is possible
that they anticipated even more evidence to be presented and were attempting to neutralize their
decision at Time2 in case the additional evidence contradicted their Time2 verdict. Markman, et
al. (1993) had similar findings, such that individuals were fearful of repeating their mistakes,
particularly if they believed they would have to make a similar decision in the future.
Interestingly, we found that negative mood accounts for nearly all the variability in
perceptions of DNA importance. This finding suggests that participants found DNA evidence
more convincing if their mood was more neutral. This could be explained by an attempt to
rationalize their change in verdict and to alleviate their dissonance over rendering an incorrect
verdict at Time1. This rationalization allowed them to attribute their change in verdict to the
presentation of “hard” evidence for or against the defendant. Those participants who did not
consider the DNA evidence to be convincing, yet still changed their verdict, were more likely to
be experiencing dissonance that could not be accounted for. This lends support to the findings of
Watson, et al. (1988), where negative affect reflected the individual’s level of distress.
The results from this study have several implications for understanding the juror
decision-making process. The presence of DNA evidence and the gender of the defendant should
be considered during the voir dire process. Given the present findings in conjunction with the
severity of the charges, these factors could prove to be reliable mediators of verdict.
Additionally, potential jurors should be screened for regret proneness in addition to the other
known factors that are known to influence verdict preference (i.e. authoritarianism, death
qualification).
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There are several limitations to this study. To begin, we believe that the perceived
responsibility manipulation was not strong enough to produce the expected results. Future
research should make the distinction clearer, as the term “juror” implies one of a group.
Research has found that personal responsibility has a direct effect on reported levels of regret
and happiness (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998). Therefore,
stronger manipulations of the perceived responsibility variable could produce interesting results
regarding regret proneness and confidence in verdicts and should be pursued in future studies.
As stated before, this study did not allow for a conviction on a lesser charge, which could
influence verdict preference and alleviated some of the dissonance reported by our participants.
In an actual criminal trial, jurors are often allowed to convict a defendant on a lesser charge
(manslaughter instead of murder) so adding this option to our current paradigm would add
ecological validity to the study.
This study is the first to investigate regret proneness and other mediating and moderating
factors influencing verdict during the guilt phase of a trial. Further research could expand this
study by investigating factors influencing the severity of the sentence handed down by the judge
after a guilty verdict. Additionally, future research should investigate the findings of Cheyne and
Dennison (2005), where lesser charge options are available to the juror. It would be interesting to
consider the factors that influence that decision, including the presence of DNA evidence and the
defendant’s gender. Finally, this study could be applied to a civil trial, where the repercussions
are more varied than simply jail time. Civil trials can result in punitive or compensatory damages
or injunctive relief. While a criminal conviction carries a social stigma, civil trials should also be
investigated to shed more light on the role of regret proneness on decision making.
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Table 1. Verdict Confidence Changes between Time1 (Pre-DNA) and Time2 (Post-DNA) for
Evidence Strengthening
Within Subjects
Pre-DNA
Post-DNA
Between Subjects

Evidence Strengthening
Guilty
Not Guilty
2.59
2.14
4.57*
-3.23*
3.58*
-.54*

* Statistically significant change from Time1 (Pre-DNA) to Time2 (Post-DNA), p < .05
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Table 2. Verdict Confidence Changes between Time1 (Pre-DNA) and Time2 (Post-DNA) for
Defendant Gender
Within Subject
Pre-DNA
Post-DNA

Defendant Gender
Male
Female
1.62
3.10
1.11*
.23*

* Statistically significant change from Time1 (Pre-DNA) to Time2 (Post-DNA), p < .05
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Figure. Path Model depicting Mediating Effects of Regret Proneness, Positive Mood, and
Negative Mood on Importance of DNA Evidence.
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Appendix A
Informed Consent Form
Principal Investigators: Stephanie Oglesby and Judith Platania, Ph.D.
1. Purpose of the Study: This study will examine anticipated regret in juror decision making during a
criminal murder trial. A minimum of 100 participants will be included in this study.
2. Procedures Experienced by Participants: By participating in this study, you will be asked to view a
summary of a criminal murder trial. You will then fill out a questionnaire regarding your attitudes toward
the amount of regret you experience surrounding your vote for verdict. Participation should take
approximately an hour, and the questionnaires will be completed in the given time today.
3. Confidentiality and Anonymity: Only the investigators listed above will have access to your
responses, which will ensure your confidentiality. Additionally, your name will only be written on your
consent form, which will be collected and maintained separately from your questionnaire. Thus, your
responses will remain anonymous.
4. Your Rights: You have the right to decline participation without any penalties or prejudice because
participation is strictly voluntary. Additionally, at any point in the study if you do not feel comfortable or
no longer want to participate, you have the right to withdraw from the study without prejudice or penalty.
You may also ask questions at any time during the course of the study and you may contact the primary
investigator (whose name, email address and telephone number appear at the bottom of this form) at any
time after you have participated in the study.
5. Compensation for Participation: Upon completion, participation in this study will be compensated in
the form of $75.00 cash.
6. Risks and Benefits of being a Participant: No physical, psychological, or emotional risks are
associated with this study. At any time during your participation, you are allowed to withdraw from this
study without facing any penalties. A potential benefit is that you might have a better understanding of
how psychological research is conducted.
More Information: After participation, please feel free to contact Dr. Judith Platania in FCAS 106, by
email at jplatania@rwu.edu, or telephone 254-5738 should you have any additional questions.
This certifies that I ___________________________________ have given my full consent to participate
Print your name
in this study. I am at least 18 years of age or older. I have read this form and fully understand the
content.
_______________________________
Participant’s Signature

_____________________
Date

This certifies that I have defined and informed the participant named above of all elements pertaining to
this research study.
_______________________________
Principal Investigator

_____________________
Date
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Appendix B
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION.
THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS ANONYMOUS SO PLEASE DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ANYWHERE ON IT.
WE ASK THAT YOU RECORD ONLY YOUR PARTICIPANT NUMBER. PLEASE READ EACH ITEM CAREFULLY
AND ANSWER AS HONESTLY AND ACCURATELY AS YOU CAN. PLEASE READ EACH ITEM AS IT IS
PRESENTED AND DO NOT GO BACK TO CHANGE YOUR ANSWERS.
The following questions are about how you make decisions. Please consider each item carefully before
responding. Rate your responses on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 = completely unlike me and 7 = completely
like me. When you have completed the entire questionnaire, please return them to the researcher.
1
2
completely unlike me

3

4

5

6

7
completely like me

_____ When I watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the available options even
while attempting to watch one program.
_____ When I am in the car listening to the radio, I often check other stations to see if
something better is playing, even if I’m relatively satisfied with what I’m listening to.
_____ I treat relationships like clothing: I expect to try a lot on before I find the perfect fit.
_____ No matter how satisfied I am with my job, it’s only right for me to be on the lookout for
better opportunities.
_____ I often fantasize about living in ways that are quite different from my actual life.
_____ I’m a big fan of lists that attempt to rank things (the best movies, the best singers, the best
athletes, the best novels, etc.).
_____ I often find it difficult to shop for a gift for a friend.
_____ When shopping, I have a hard time finding clothing that I really love.
_____ Renting DVD’s is really difficult. I’m always struggling to pick the best one.
_____ I find that writing is very difficult, even if it’s just writing a letter to a friend, because it’s
so hard to word things just right. I often do several drafts of even simple things.
_____ No matter what I do, I have the highest standards for myself.
_____ I never settle for second best.
_____ Whenever I’m faced with a choice, I try to imagine what all the other possibilities are,
even ones that aren’t present at the moment.
_____ Whenever I make a choice, I’m curious about what would have happened if I had chosen
differently.
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_____ Whenever I make a choice, I try to get information about how the other alternatives
turned out.
_____ If I make a choice and it turns out well, I still feel like something of a failure if I find out
that another choice would have turned out better.
_____ When I think about how I’m doing in life, I often assess opportunities I have passed up.
_____ Once I make decisions, I don’t look back.
_____ No matter what it takes, I always try to choose the best thing.
_____ I don’t like having to settle for “good enough”.
_____ I am a maximizer – I take advantage of every opportunity presented to me.
_____ I will wait for the best option, no matter how long it takes.
_____ I am uncomfortable making decisions before I know all of my options.
_____ I never settle.
For the following questions, please use the rating scale below:
1
Strongly
Agree

2
Somewhat
Agree

3
Neutral

4
Somewhat
Disagree

5
Strongly
Disagree

_____ Appointed judges are more competent than elected judges.
_____ A suspect who runs from the police most probably committed the crime.
_____ A defendant should be found guilty if only 11 out of 12 jurors vote guilty.
_____ Most politicians are really as honest as humanly possible.
_____ Too often jurors hesitate to convict someone who is guilty out of pure sympathy.
_____ In most cases where the accused presents a strong defense, it is only because of a good
lawyer.
_____ In general, children should be excused for their misbehavior.
_____ The death penalty is cruel and inhumane.
_____ Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which
they are charged.
_____ For serious crimes like murder, a defendant should be found guilty if there was a 90%
chance that he committed the crime.

REGRET PRONENESS, EVIDENCE STRENGTHENING

39

_____ Defense lawyers don’t really care about guilt or innocence, they are just in business to
make money.
_____ Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the
crime.
_____ Circumstantial evidence is too weak to use in court.
_____ Many accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony.
_____ The defendant is often a victim of his own bad reputation.
_____ If the jury recommends that a person be brought to trial, then he probably committed the
crime.
_____ Extenuating circumstances should not be considered – if a person commits a crime, then
that person should be punished.
_____ Hypocrisy is on the increase in society.
_____ Too many innocent people are wrongfully imprisoned.
_____ If a majority of the evidence – but not all of it – suggest that the defendant committed the
crime, the jury should vote not guilty.
_____ If the defendant committed a victimless crime, like gambling or possession of marijuana,
he should never be convicted.
_____ Some laws are made to be broken.
For the following items, please check the box most appropriate for you.
Are you 18 years old or older?



No
Yes

[1]
[2]

Are you a United States citizen?



No
Yes

[1]
[2]

Are you registered to vote?



No
Yes

[1]
[2]
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Do you feel that your views on the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would prevent or
substantially impair your ability to act as a fair and impartial juror in this case?



No
Yes

[1]
[2]

Please read through the following summary of a criminal trial. After reading the summary you will be
asked to determine a verdict. Your will be one of twelve individuals currently reading through the
summary and casting your vote in the case. The simple majority (7 of 12 individuals) will decide the
verdict in this case.
MODIFIED TRIAL SUMMARY OF WILSON V. UNITED STATES
On the morning of December 13, 2003, Amanda Wilson was found dead in the passenger seat of
her Ford Expedition, which was parked in the 3000 block of West Street. She had been shot in the head
and died sometime around midnight on December 13, 2003. After police arrived on the scene, they
discovered that both the vehicle and Mrs. Wilson had previously been reported missing. Police contacted
the woman’s husband, Jeff Wilson, to inform him of his wife's death and later that day interviewed him to
gather information regarding the woman’s death. Mr. Wilson was arrested for the murder in the first
degree of his wife. In addition, the prosecution is seeking the death penalty in this case against Mr.
Wilson.
During the trial, Detective Blackwell testified that Mr. Wilson told him that on the evening of
December 12, 2003, he and his wife went to dinner at an Olive Garden restaurant and then to a movie.
According to Mr. Wilson’s account, when they arrived at their home just after 11:00 p.m., his wife said
she wanted something sweet to eat. Mr. Wilson remained at home while his wife went to a Shell gas
station about a quarter-mile away to purchase candy. He fell asleep on the couch and when he woke up,
his wife had not returned. When she did not answer her cell phone, he got into his car and drove by the
gas station and around the neighborhood, searching for her. Mr. Wilson told police that he could not recall
the name of the movie he and his wife saw and that he was not in the area she was found that evening.
On December 31, 2003, an FBI Agent interviewed Mr. Wilson. During that interview, Mr.
Wilson told the Agent that after dinner at the Olive Garden, he and his wife had seen the 9:30 p.m.
showing of the movie “Bad Santa”. Mr. Wilson repeated the account he had given Detective Blackwell
about the couple returning home around 11:00 p.m. about Amanda Wilson going to the Shell station to
purchase a sweet snack; Mr. Wilson falling asleep, waking to discover that his wife was not home, and
placing a call to her (which he said went directly to her voice mail); and going out to search for her in the
neighborhood around his home and the adjacent neighborhood. In addition, he told the Agent that while
searching for his wife, he saw a woman in the parking lot of the Shell station changing her car tire and he
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offered assistance. After he changed the tire, the woman gave him a ride to his house Mr. Wilson reports
that he called his mother, continued the search for his wife, and, at around 3:30 or 3:40 a.m., called 911 to
report his wife missing.
The prosecution presented testimony by Renee Johnson, Mr. Wilson’s former co-worker, with
whom he began an ongoing romantic relationship in June 2003. Ms. Johnson testified that Mr. Wilson
told her that he was not happy in his marriage and that he was planning to leave his wife. The couple was
seen out together on numerous occasions.
Another FBI Agent testified that during the investigation of Mrs. Wilson’s death, one of Mr.
Wilson’s friends, Robert Thompson, told investigators that he had given Mr. Wilson a gun. The Agent
further testified that Mr. Thompson offered to allow FBI agents to place video and audio recording
equipment in his car and to engage Mr. Wilson in a conversation that investigators could record. During a
recorded conversation that took place on January 6, 2005, Mr. Wilson denied killing his wife but told Mr.
Thompson that he had thrown the gun that Mr. Thompson had given him into the local river right after the
police called him to inform him that his wife's body had been found. The government relied on the
videotape to prove that Mr. Thompson gave Mr. Wilson a gun a week before Amanda Wilson's murder.
An insurance company officer testified that on December 19, 2003, the company received an
application from Mr. Wilson to purchase a life insurance policy on his wife. The application had been
completed on December 7, 2003. The government also presented the testimony of a cell phone expert
who stated that Mr. Wilson’s cell phone was in the area where Mrs. Wilson’s body was found around the
time of death.
Based on the information presented above, Mr. Wilson is:
 Not Guilty
 Guilty

[1]
[2]
of first degree murder of Mrs. Wilson

I am satisfied with my verdict.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
completely

3

4

5

6

7
completely

3

4

5

6

7
completely

The result of this case is reasonable.
1
not at all

2

The witnesses are believable.
1
not at all

2
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The prosecution proved their case.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
completely
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Additional Evidence
One year after the trial, a DNA expert discovered that DNA from Mr. Wilson was found on the
underside of Amanda Wilson's fingernails. The prosecution presented evidence that Mr. Wilson had gun
shot residue on his hand when he was interviewed on the day his wife’s body was found. Bobby Jones
and his son Travis testified that at approximately 12:45 or 1:00 a.m. on December 13, 2003, they were
walking home from a bus stop and saw a Ford Expedition parked on the 3000 block of West Street. Mr.
Jones testified that he saw a man and a woman inside the car talking. Both Mr. Jones and Travis testified
that Mr. Wilson was the person they saw inside the car.

Based on the additional information presented above, the defendant is:
 Not Guilty
 Guilty

[1]
[2]
of first degree murder of Mrs. Wilson.

I am satisfied with the outcome of this case.
1
not at all

2

3

4

5

6

7
completely

3

4

5

6

7
completely

4

5

6

7
completely

The witnesses are believable.
1
not at all

2

The DNA evidence was convincing.
1
not at all

2

3
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Please use the following scale to indicate your feelings towards each of the statements below.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
Strongly
Agree

_____ Our country needs a powerful leader, in order to destroy the radical and immoral currents
prevailing in society today.
_____ Our country needs free thinkers, who will have the courage to stand up against traditional
ways, even if this upsets many people.
_____ The ‘‘old-fashioned ways’’ and ‘‘old-fashioned values’’ still show the best way to live.
_____ Our society would be better off if we showed tolerance and understanding for
untraditional values and opinions.
_____ God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed before it
is too late, violations must be punished.
_____ The society needs to show openness towards people thinking differently, rather than a
strong leader, the world is not particularly evil or dangerous.
_____ It would be best if newspapers were censored so that people would not be able to get hold
of destructive and disgusting material.
_____ Many good people challenge the state, criticize the church and ignore ‘‘the normal way
of living’’.
_____ Our forefathers ought to be honored more for the way they have built our society, at the
same time we ought to put an end to those forces destroying it.
_____ People ought to put less attention to the Bible and religion, instead they ought to develop
their own moral standards.
_____ There are many radical, immoral people trying to ruin things; society ought to stop them.
_____ It is better to accept bad literature than to censor it.
_____ Facts show that we have to be harder against crime and sexual immorality in order to
uphold law and order.
_____ The situation in the society of today would be improved if troublemakers were treated
with reason and humanity.
_____ If the society so wants, it is the duty of every true citizen to help eliminate the evil that
poisons our country from within.
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This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each
item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way
right now. Use the following scale to record your answers:
1
very slightly or not at all

2
a little

3
moderately

4
quite a bit

______attentive

______ strong

______ irritable

______ inspired

______ afraid

______ alert

______ upset

______ active

______ guilty

______ nervous

______ excited

______ hostile

______ proud

______ jittery

______ ashamed

______ scared

______ enthusiastic

______ distressed

______ determined

______ interested

5
extremely

Please use the following scale to indicate your feelings towards each of the statements below:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4

5

6
Strongly
Agree

_____ I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
_____ My personal space is usually messy and disorganized.
_____ I believe that orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics
of a good student.
_____ I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
_____ I enjoy having clear a clear and structured mode of life.
_____ I don’t like situations that are uncertain.
_____ I like to have friends who are unpredictable.
_____ I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might happen.
_____ I dislike unpredictable situations.
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_____ I don’t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
_____ When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly.
_____ I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently.
_____ I would describe myself as indecisive.
_____ I tend to struggle with most decisions.
_____ When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it’s confusing.
_____ I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many different things.
_____ It’s annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind.
_____ I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or intention is unclear to me.
_____ In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong.
_____ Even after I’ve made up my mind about something, I’m always eager to consider a
different opinion.
_____

When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be
right.

_____ When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as
possible.
_____ I always see many different solutions to problems I face.
_____ I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view.

Please indicate your gender.



Male [ 1 ]
Female [ 2 ]

What race/ethnicity do you most identify with?






White/Caucasian
Black/African-American
Hispanic/Latino
Asian
Other

What is your class year?

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
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Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Other

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

What is your religious affiliation?






Catholic
Protestant
Jewish
Muslim
Other

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]

How would you evaluate your political views?





Liberal
Slightly Liberal
Slightly Conservative
Conservative

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]

Are you, a close friend of, or related to, anyone employed in the justice system? (police officer, judge,
attorney, etc.)



No
Yes

[1]
[2]
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